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IN 'THE~ SUPREME C.QUR.T

of the
s·rATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. BERRY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 8786

LOUIS G. 110ENCH,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 1, 1956, Robert J. Berry filed an action
against Louis G. Moench, M.D., claiming the defendant
on or about September 12, 1956 wrote a letter to Dr. J. S.
Hellewell without authority to do so, containing untrue
and defamatory matter regarding the plaintiff. The
plaintiff was damaged by the letter. Defendant :filr(l an
answer admitting the writing of the letter (Exhibit 2),
denying the statements were defamatory or untrue, and
setting up affirmative defenses alleging a conditional
privilege arising from performance of a moral, social, or
medical duty, together with reasonable cause to believe
that the statements made were true. Defendant further
alleged that he acted without malice and set up a further
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affirmative defense that the statements contained in the
letter were true. The case was pretried before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, one of the Judges of the Third Judicial
District on the 5th day of September, 1957. The Court
made certain findings of fact and rulings of law (R. 5-7),
including a ruling as a matter of law that the defendant
had a conditional privilege when he wrote and published
pretrial Exhibit 2. Plaintiff moved to amend the pretrial
findings regarding conditional privilege. The matter was
heard before Judge Ellett September 19, 1957 (R. 8),
and the pretrial order as made \Y.as allowed to stand.
Trial came on before the Honorable Ray \Tan Cott,
Jr., ~itting 'vith jury on October 9, 1957. Prior to selecting the jury, plaintiff again moved to amend the pretrial
order 'vith regard to conditional privilege and the plaintiff's motion \\'"as denied. ..A. jury was selected, testimony
\\·as adduced on behalf of both parties.
Omitting stock instructions, the jury was instructed
hy the court as follows:
.. ln~truction Xo. 1: You are instructed that
the plaintiff by his eon1plaint alleged that the defendant is a Doctor of ~Iedicine specializing in
p~ychiatry in ~alt Lake c~ounty . litah. That in the
yPn r 1n4-n the plaintiff rereiYed professional care
frotn t]H\ defendnnt: that on the 12th day of SeptPtnhPl\ 1~l;)t). the defendant .Jroencl1 forwarded to
Dr .•T. ~- flelle"·t-.II of EYnnston. ,,~~~onring. a letter
"·ith rPft\n\nc(.. tn the plaintiff. "~hirh "-ras further
<'Pilllnunicn t-ed In~ said Dr. Hellewell to Mr. and
~I r~. ,J. 'rillinn1~ of tht\ sa1ne city. That the plaint i f'f nllt\g-<'~ thn t said lett<.~ I". \rhich l1as been introdu('(\d i;1 t\YidPJH'P in this case and is Inarked Exltihit ;2 ht\rPin~ contnined eertain def.a1natory stateSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3
ments in reference to the plaintiff and that as a
result of said defamation the plaintiff has received
damage in character and reputation in general
damages in the sum of $25,000.00.
"Plaintiff further alleges that said statements
of the defendant were made with malice and as .a
consequence thereof he is entitled to punitive damages in the sum of $25,000.00. Plaintiff further
alleges that the statements that are claimed by him
to be defamatory are untrue.
"To the plaintiff's complaint the defendant
has filed his answer wherein he sets forth and admits that the letter, Exhibit No. 2, was sent by him
in the performance of a moral, social and medic.al
duty.
"The above and foregoing is a summarized
statement of the plaintiffs's complaint and defendant's answer, insofar as it is applicable in
these instructions up to this point.

"-

"You are further instructed that the defend·ant in the making of the statements as contained
in Exhibit No. 2 by virtue of his position and relationship to the plaintiff and Dr. Hellewell was, as
a matter of law, entitled to make the same because
of his qualified privilege, and that for the making
of such statements the defendant is not liable to
the plaintiff unless the plaintiff proves by a pre .
ponderance of the evidence the following matters
which now constitute the elements of his cause of
action against the defendant.
"You are instructed, however, that if the
plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence the following elements then and in that
event he would be entitled to recover." ( l~. 138-139)
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"Instruction No. 2: You are instructed that
the elements of the plaintiff's cause of action as
it now stands are as follows :
"1. That the Exhibit 2 contains one or more
statements that are defamatory to the plaintiff
as that term will be hereinafter defined to you:
"2. That one or more of said defamatory
statements as contained in Exhibit 2 was made
by the defendant about the plaintiff with actual
malice as that term will be hereinafter defined to
you:
"3. That as a pTo:ximate result of said defamatory statement, or statements, the plaintiff
suffered damages, and their value in money.
"You are instructed that in the event the
plaintiff fails in his proof by a preponderance of
the evidence of any one, or more, of the three elements that go to constitute his cause of action,
as heretofore mentioned, that in th.at event the
issues should be found in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff.
"The defendant's defenses that you "ill eonsider in this matter are two in nun1ber. The first
one is that the statements contained in Exhibit No.
2 are not, nor is .any of then1, defrunatory. Seeondly, that if any statement, or statements, contained
in Exhibit 2 are found by the jury to be defan1atory the defendant alleges that such statements
are true.
"You are instructed that the burden of proof
is upon the defendant to prove by a. preponderance of the evidence one or more of his defenses
as heretofore 1nentioned and ~~ou are instructed
that in the event you find fro1n all of the evidence
that any one, or more, of said two defenses haYe
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been proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that they, or it, would be a complete bar to the
right of the plaintiff to recover herein .and your
verdict in that instance should be in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff, no cause of
action.
"You are instructed that where a litigant has
the burden of proving a matter in issue by a preponderance of the evidence that such litigant does
not sustain that burden if the evidence is equally
balanced between him and his opponent, or preponderates in favor of his opponent." (R. 139-140)
"Instruction l~ o. 3 : You are instructed that
Dr. :Nioench in the publication and sending of the
letter, Exhibit 2, as h.as heretofore been mentioned,
was entitled under the law to do so by virtue of
the fact that he had a qualified privilege so to do
and you are instructed that before that qualified
privilege can be overco1ne, or destroyed, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant's action in so doing was
prompted by actual malice. You are instructed
that this kind of malice which overcomes and destroys the qualified privilege has been defined to
mean the following kind of action; namely, that
the .acts of the defendant Moench were done with
spite, ill will or hatred towards the plaintiff and
with a wicked motive which induced the defendant
to defame the plaintiff." (R. 140-141)
"Instruction No. 5 : In determining whethe~'
or not the letter by Dr. Moench was defamatory,
as that term is used in our law, you are instructed
that you should consider the component parts of
the letter, .as well as the letter in its entirety.
"Under the law, if the letter contains staternen ts of fact, and if you determine that such

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

facts were true as of the date of the letter, then
you should consider whether there are additional
statements, either of fact, or of opinion. If, after
such determination, you find that such ,additional
statements of fact were reasonable inferences from
the true facts, and if you further find that the
statements of opinion were based upon Dr.
Moench's professional interpretation of the facts,
then he is not liable." (R. 141)
"Instruction No. 9 : You .are instructed that
the letter itself and the statements therein contained are not evidence or proof of 'actual malice'
and in order to prove 'actual malice' plaintiff must
produce evidence apart from the letter proving
that Dr. Moench wrote the letter because of spite,
ill will, or hatred ,apart from the letter or the
statements contained therein, your verdict must
be in favor of Dr. Moench and against plaintiff,
'no cause of action'." (R. 143-144)
"Instruction No. 10: In determining whether
Dr. Moench wrote the letter of September 12,
1956 with malice, you should consider, among
other things, whether Dr. Moench had probable
cause to believe that the statements he n1ade in
the letter were true.
"This is because, under the law, the presence
of probable cause is evidence of good faith and
of the absence of 1nalice." (R. 144)
"Instruction No. 11 : You are instructed that
if, after a consideration of the evidence in this
case, you find that Dr. l\Ioench acted as a reasonably prudent Doctor of Psychiatry in obtaining
a medical history of plaintiff fro1n sourees reasonably available, even though some of the infornlation obtained was hearsay or the .actual truth
thereof not known, and that the letter was 'vritten
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under the reasonable belief and in good faith tb:-~_t
the statements were correct, then you are instructed that it makes no difference whether or
not the statements can now be shown to be incorrect.
"Therefore, if you find from the evidence in
this case that Dr. Moench did reasonably believe
the statements to be correct, your verdict must he
in favor of Dr. Moench and against plaintiff, no
cause of action, \Vhether such statements were correct or incorrect, unless plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that such statements
were made because of 'actual malice' against plaintiff." (R. 144)
"Instruction No. 12 : As a summary of some
of the instructions herein, but not all inclusive or
exclusive of the other instructions, you are instructed that to find for the plaintiff the following
must be found by you to be the f.acts in accordance
with the burden of proof mentioned.
"1.

That the matters are defamatory.

"2.

That they are untrue if defamatory.·

"3. That the defamation was made by the
defendant of the plaintiff with actual malice.
"4.

That plaintiff sustained damage.

"To find for the defendant you must find in
accordance with the burdens of proof mentioned
the following facts.
"1. That there was no actual malice by the
defendant towards the plaintiff at the time of
making the statements, or,
arc~

"2. That none of the statements in Exhibit 2
defamatory, or,
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"3. That all defamatory statements made by
the defendant of the plaintiff were true, or,
"4. That plaintiff has sustained no damage.''
(R. 144-145)
The plaintiff excepted to all the foregoing instructions,
and in addition, excepted to the court's refusal to give
plaintiff's requested instructions No. 4, 5, 6, 7, 7-A and
8.
The case was argued and submitted to the jury. The
jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. Plaintiff
moved for .a new trial on the grounds of the court's ruling
on conditional privilege as a matter of law and the court's
instructions regarding conditional privilege and requiring
and defining actual malice. The motion ,,~as denied by
the court and the plaintiff filed notice of .appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The p·arties are referred to as in the trial court. On
September 12, 1956, the defendant, Louis G. ::Jfoench, Doctor of Medicine specializing in psychiatry at the Salt
Lake Clinic in Salt Lake City, Utah, since 19±4, \\·Tote a
letter (R. 5, P. 3) to J. S. Helle\vell, ~I.D., .a physician
practicing in Evanston, Wyon1ing (R. 6, P. 7). The letter
was in response to a request of J.S. Helle\vell (Exhibit
1) which read as follows:
4
'

Dear Doctor Helle\vell:

"Since I don't have his authorization, the patient you 1nentioned in your last letter \\rill remain
nameless, but:
"He was treated here in 1949 .as an e1nergenry.
Our diagnosis was ~fanic depressiYe depression
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in a psychopathic personality. This is an unusual
combination, and in retrospect, the psychopathic
personality was the major problem. He had one
brother as a manic, and his father committed
suicide. The patient was attempting to go thru
school on the GI bill when we saw him. Instead
of attending class he would spend most of the days
.and nights playing cards for money. Because of
family circumstances, we treated him for a mere
token charge (and I notice even that has never
been paid). During his care here, he purchased
a brand new Packard, -vvithout even money to buy
gasoline.
"Ever since he was a small boy, he has been
able to get away v1ith things. He has always been
in trouble and someone has always rescued him.
He has not .assumed responsibility. He was in
constant trouble with the authorities during the
war, left a number of jobs, did not do well in
school, and never did really support his wife and
children.
"Since he was here, we have had repeated
requests for abstracts of his record, indicating
repeated trouble. Our last request awhile back
was from the Colorado State Hospital.
"My suggestion to the infatuated girl would
be to run as fast .and as far as she possibly could,
in any direction away frorn him. I doubt she will
follow any such suggestions until she has had 4 or
5 years of married hell. It is terribly unfortunate
that psychopaths are so .attractive to women, and
get women emotionally entangled with them, and
almost immediately in any relationship get the girl
to feel like taking on a crusade of s.aving the poor,
misunderstood person ('only you can straighten
me out!'). Of course, if he doesn't marry her, he
will marry someone else and make life hell for
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that person. The usual story is repeated unsuccessful marriages and a trail of t:vagedy behind.
"Yours very truly
"Louis G. Moench, M.D.
At the time of writing the letter, the plaintiff was
not a patient of Dr. Moench. The defendant had not seen,
nor had contact with the plaintiff for a period of approximately seven ye.ars. The defendant's sole contacts with
the plaintiff had been on and following September 24,
1949. On that date, plaintiff Berry visited Dr. nfoench
at the request of Ethella Berry, who was then his wife,
concerning certain marital difficulties bet\veen plaintiff
and Ethella. Ethella previously talked to a Dr. Miller (R.
5-6) at the Salt Lake Clinic, as had her sister, both giving purported information about the plaintiff on which
part of the clinical record was based. Plaintiff had an
interview with the defendant on that date for a period of
between thirty minutes and one hour, a portion of which
time Ethella Berry and Dr. ~!iller were present. The
defendant was unable to remember which p.art of the
history he had gained fron1 Dr. ~filler's notes, \vhich part
from Ethella Berry, and 'vhich part from the defendant
(R. 22-28, inclusive). Thereafter, the plaintiff took four
shock treatments, the last being on October 1, 1949.
Though further treatments were advised by defendant,
they were then discontinued by plaintiff (R. 15-16).
With respect to the statements 1nade in the letter set
forth supra, plaintiff admits that his father committed
suicide, but denies every other allegation contained in
the letter. The defendant admitted by a letter written at
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the request of the plaintiff on September 17, 1956 (R. 3)
that very little medical history w.as furnished by Mr.
Berry, most having been volunteered by his wife. The
clinic had no v1ay of verifying the information (R. 3).
Though the defendant had not seen the plaintiff for a
period of seven years, and was aware that he did not
have the plaintiff's authorization (see paragraph 1 of
Exhibit 2)-"Dear Dr. Hellewell: Since I don't have his
authorization, the patient you mentioned in your last
letter will remain nameless, but-", the doctor saw fit to
give advice regarding the patient's condition at the
present time (see last p.aragraph of Exhibit 2). The
doctor further slandered the pLaintiff's credit (Exhibit
2)-"Because of family circumstances, we treated him for
a 1nere token charge (and I notice even that has never
been paid)'', though he admitted at the trial that .all the
bill, with the exception of $5.00, had been paid (R. 25),
and the doctor had no interest in the patient at the time
of writing the letter.
The defendant had no interest in and did not even
know Dr. I-Iellewell's patient, J. Williams, for whom the
information w.as asked, nor Williams' daughter, Mary
Boothe (R. 34). At the time of the writing of the letter
(Exhibit 2), plaintiff was divorced from Ethella Berry,
was 37 years of age, the father of two children, and was
living alone in Salt Lake City. He was keeping company
with Mary Boothe, daughter of Mr . .and Mrs. J. Williams
of Evanston, Wyoming, who was later married to the
plaintiff in December 1956 (R. 89). Mary Boothe was a
woman 37 years of age and had a 13-year-old son, Steven
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(R. 89); she had lived away from her parents for various
p·eriods. She h:ad met the plaintiff more than a year before the letter was written; had been going with him
rather regularly for some time. Plaintiff had met !1r.
and Mrs. J. Willia1ns but at the time of the letter plaintiff and Mary Boothe had made no definite marriage
plans.
With regard to the truth or falsity of the statements
contained in the letter, defendant could not remember
from whom the information had been gained, stating both
on the stand and in Exhibit 3 that :ilir. Berry furnished
very little medical history, and most of the history was
furnished by his wife and not verified. He did not know
the name of plaintiff's brother or the state of the plaintiff's financial condition at the time he alleged (Exhibit
2), " ... he purchased a brand new Packard, ''ithout even
money to buy gasoline", the plaintiff having purchased
the automobile with money received through an inheritance (R. 57). The only evidence regarding the plaintiff's
progress and success in school indicates that his studies
were always above the average (R. 57-59, inclusive).
The only basis of any troubles as .a s1nall boy \vas hearsay
to the doctor from the for1ner l\Irs. Berry, \Yith the exception of his ad1nission that he once stole a chicken (R. 62).
I-Ie was involved in an incident regarding tl1e black nlarketing of cigarettes \vhile in .£_t\.frica during \\T orld \\' ar II,
but came back and worked for the san1e con1p.any in the
United States (R. 62), this being the only evidence supporting Dr. Moench's staten1ent that he \vas in constant
trouble \vith the- authorities during the \var. There is no
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evidence regarding his failure to support his wife and
children (Exhibit 2). Dr. Hell ewell in his letter (Exhibit
1) asked only for " ... a brief resume of his condition and
your impressions of the man," .and the doctor in his reply
gave not only a series of unsupported, purportedly factual
staten1ents, but his suggestions as to ho'v Dr. Hellewell
should proceed to advise 'vith regard to a forthcoming
marriage of a person who was not Dr. Hellewell's patient,
but a daughter of Dr. Hellewell's p.atient (Exhibit 2).

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The plaintiff assigns the following errors :
1. The pretrial court and the trial court e-rred in
holding that there was a conditional privilege as a matter
of law.
2. The trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding .actual malice in Instructions 2, 11, 12, and in
failing to give plaintiff's requested Instruction 2 as to
actual malice.

3. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 10 on
probable cause and reason to believe, and failure to give
plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 7-A, on the basis
of reasonable diligence ,and the reasonable n1an test.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PRETRIAL COURT AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN H~OLDING THERE WAS A ·CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE AS A MATTER OF LAW. (.A.ssignment No.1).
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The defendant, Louis G. Moench, at the time of his
communication (Exhibit 2), had no present interest in
the defendant, Robert J. Berry. His only interest in
Mary Boothe, Berry's present wife, was at that time an
acquaintance of Dr. J. S. Hellewell, who had as patients
Mr. and Mrs. J. S. Williams who are the father and
mother of Mary Boothe, a 37 year old, previously 1narried
mother. The defendant wrote the letter claimed to be
libelous under full knowledge that he was without authorization. He knew .at the time that he had not seen nor had
communication with the subject of the letter, the plaintiff,
for a period of seven years. Defendant did not know the
plaintiff's present condition; having testified that since
he had treated the plaintiff, he had treated some 800
persons with a similar diagnosis and that he had improved
or cured a majority of them to the point where they were
making a success of marriage (R. 53-54). By his own
admission, the defendant's statements as to the unknown
brother being a manic, the financial situation \Yith regard
to the bill for the doctor's treatment, the statement as to
the plaintiff's trouble as a small boy and during the war,
and as to plaintiff's record in school were based on hearsay from a wife who, as the doctor was a\\. .are, was coming
to the Salt Lake Clinic due to troubles \Yith her marriage.
All the statements were without a reasonable basis for
belief and referred to a tin1e seven years past. The facts,
as set forth in the letters the1nselves and in the evidence
produced in the court, do not show any interest in the
doctor, the publisher of the letter, such as to give conditional privilege to publish defamatory matter under our
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present statutes or the rulings by our Supreme Court.
There appear to be no late cases regarding a privilege in infor1ning a person with regard to character or
background of a lover or suitor, but the courts have ruled
on the problem as far back as 1858 when the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in Krebs v. Oliver, 78 Mass. 12
Gray 239, stated "Statements that a man has been imprisoned
for larceny 1nade to the family of a woman who
is about to marry, by one who is no relation of
either, and not in answer to inquiries, are not
privileged communications."
Also, the same Court in 1862, J aannes v. Bennett, 87 Mass.
5 Allen, 169; 81 Am. Dec. 738, stated"A letter to .a woman containing libelous matter concerning her suitor cannot be justified on
the ground that the writer was her friend and
former pastor, and that the letter was written at
the request of her parents who assented to all its
contents."
In the Supreme Court of New York in 1888 in the case of
Byam v. Coll1Jns, 111 N.Y. 143; 19 N.E. 75; 7 Am. St. Rep.
726; 2 L.R.A. 129, the Court stated "A libelous letter concerning the suitor of
the person addressed, not written .at the latter's
request but apparently at the instance of common
friends, to prevent a marriage, is not privileged
by reason of previous friendships nor by reason
of a request made four years before the acquaintance of the suitor was made for information of
anything known to the writer concerning any
young man addressed the writer went with or
any young man in ,the case.''
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True, our statute sets forth the conditions under which
libelous matter may be conditionally privileged, and the
Court in these fairly recent cases, I-Iales v. The Bank of
SpaniJsh Fork, ______ Utah ______ , 197 P. (2d) 910, and Coombs
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., ______ Utah ______ , 228 P. (2d) 275,
discussed these cases. The Hales case was a case involving the person suspected of cashing a forged instrument,
and the hank and employees of the bank which cashed the
instrument were financially injured. The Coombs case
involved an employee-employer relationship. Quoting
from the Coombs case at page 277, the Court stated "An occasion is conditionally privileged when
circumstances induce a correct, reasonable belief
that (.a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently
important interest of the publisher, and (b) the
recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter
will be of service in the lawful protection of the
~nterest." (Emphasis added.)
the interest referred to being set forth by that case as the
interest of the publisher. Where, in the above case, is the
interest of the defendant, Dr. ~foench, which requires la-\Yful protection~ Quoting further fron1 the Coo1ubs case" The st.a tement Inust be in protection of the
interest or the performance of the duty. There
must also be an honest belief in the truth of the
stateinent."
Though the doctor defendant clain1s a duty in his answer
and in his testi1nony, it is a private rather than a public
duty and an alleged dut~~ to persons, to-"~it, :Jir. ,and :1\Irs.
J. Willia1ns and their daughter, ~lary Boothe, "~hon1 the
doctor did not even kno\\' at the tin1e of the publishing.
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The present case must be differentiated from Williams
v. Standard Examtner Publishtng Co., 83 Utah 31, 27
P. ( 2d) 1, on the basis that that case concerns a public
interest arising from the actions of a public official concerning the water supply for an entire city. The Coombs
case quoted supra, also stated at page 225 "As indicated in the foregoing quotation, it
must be for the purpose of safeguarding the interest,''
and,
". . . must also be ,a proper interest on the
part of the one to whom the inquiry is made."
Again, we ask; where is the interest or duty of the defendant, Dr. Moench, with regard to the \Villiamses and their
daughter, Mary Boothe, who were unknown to the publisher (R. 34).
The other basis for the conditional privilege is a
reasonable belief in the truth of the statements made.
The defendant admits through all his testimony and in
the letter to Mr. and Mrs. J. Williams (Exhibit 3), that
little of the medical history came from the defendant,
most of it having been furnished by the wife and wife's
sister to Dr. Miller (R. 26-34, inclusive).
vVith regard to reasonable belief, the one place where
the doctor could have checked his statement without effort was with regard to the phrase in Exhibit 2, "Because
of family circumstances, we treated him for a mere token
charge (and I notice even that has never been paid)."
The records of payments by the plaintiff were kept at the
clinic where the doctor worked and the doctor testified
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at the trial that all charges, with the exception of $5.00,
had been paid (R. 24-25).
The record shows no proper interest in Dr. Moench
which should have been protected or w.as in any way
protected by his publication to Dr. Hellewell a statement
for the use of Hellewell's patient, J. Vvilliams; and further shows no basis of reasonable belief that the statements made were true. In fact, Exhibit 2 goes far beyond
the inquiry by Dr. Hellewell's letter (Exhibit 1). The
statements in Exhibit 2 purport to be statements of
presently existing f.acts rather than conclusions based on
hearsay information derived some seven years ago. Further, the doctor testified himself that persons with the
medical diagnosis he had given the plaintiff and published
to Hellewell were subject to cure to the point where the
patient could have a happy marriage. The doctor stated
that he had treated some 800 patients with this primary
diagnosis since he had seen the plaintiff, and he had been
able to effect cures in the majority of those 800 patients
to the point where they "\vere making a success of their
marriages (R. 53-54).
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY REGARDING ACTUAL MALICE IN INSTRUCTIONS
2, 11, 12, AND IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 AS TO ACTUAL MALICE.
(~Assignment No. 2)

Due to the Court's ruling that a conditional privilege
existed as a n1atter of la,v. and that the eonditional
privilege 1nust be overcome or destroyed, the Court found
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it necessary at sever.al places in the instructions to
comment "One or more defamatory statements as contained in Exhibit 2 was made by the defendant about
the plaintiff vvith actual malice as that term w~ll be here~nafter deftned." The Court referred to actual malice in
paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 2, Instruction Nos. 3, 9,
10, 11, and Instruction No. 12, subparagraph 3 (see instructions set forth in the statement of the case supra).
The law is uncontested that in the absence of
privilege, either absolute or conditional, malice is inferred
from proof of the defamatory nature of a written statement. Therefore, we contend that the Court, as a condition of its error in ruling that there was a conditional
privilege, also erred in all its instructions to the jury
wherein a finding of actual malice was a prerequisite
to a verdict for the plaintiff.
Even though there be no error in the Court's ruling
of conditional privilege, it is the plaintiff's contention
that the Court erred in defining actual malice in its
Instruction No. 9 on the basis that it is not necessary
to produce evidence apart from the publication proving
that the defendant wrote the letter because of spite, ill
will or hatred, .apart from the letter or the statements
contained therein (R. 143, Instruction No. 9), plaintiff
contending that the publication itself, without further
evidence, may show the malice of the publisher; for
example, the defendant in publishing the letter starts
out by recognizing the impropriety of a person in his
profession releasing confidential information concerning
a former patient without the patient's permission when
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he states, "Since I don't have his authorization, the patient you mentioned in your last letter will remain nameless, but:" - the doctor having a state of mind at that
time showing knowledge that the release of the information from the balance of the letter (Exhibit 2), and the
reasonable belief in the truth thereof were such that he
feared to put the former patient's name in the letter.
Secondly, he made a statement as to the defendant's
credit, stating that he had not been paid even the token
charge, while the books of the clinic, by the doctor's
own testimony, showed that $45.00 of a $50.00 bill had
been paid. Third, the doctor in the last paragraph of
the letter (Exhibit 2) seeks to advise another doctor
as to what to suggest to an infatuated girl, a woman
of 37 .and unknown to him, in her relations to a man
whom the doctor had not seen for seven years, setting
forth in no uncertain terms his idea of the consequences
of the marriage between the two persons.
Though we are aware that the Coombs case quoted
supra sets forth the language used in the Judge's Instruction No. 9 in this case, the facts are different, this
case showing the doctor's own recommendations as to
what to tell an "infatuated girl" and showing the doctor's
intent to attempt to prevent a marriage bet\Yeen a. girl
unknown to him and a for1ner patient of seYen years
ago .and about 'vhose condition he presently kne"T nothing.
The malice may be inferred fron1 the paragraphs in the
letter heretofore discussed and also by the letter as a
whole.
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With reference to the above reasoning, the following
cases: Warren v. PurliJtzer Publish~ng Co., 78 S.W. (2d)
404- Missouri; Cook v. Purlitzer Publishing Co., 241 Mo.
326, 145 S.W. 480- 492; Boehm v. Western Leather and
Cloth Co., 161 S.W. (2d) 710- Missouri, state"Proof of falsity of f.acts and knowledge of
such falsity is proof of actual malice in a libelous
action."
In the instant case, the records of payment to the Salt
Lake Clinic by the plaintiff were available to the defendant; yet, he made the above statement concerning plaintiff's payment. The Cook case supra, holds at page 491
that,
"Proof that the charge is false destroys the
Privilege."
In Stevenson v. Morris, 288 Pa. 405, 136 A. 234, 50 A.L.R.
335, it was stated at page 235 of the Atlantic citation,
"To claim the benefit of privilege and absolve
himself from suspicion of being actuated by malicious motives, defendant was bound to use reasonable effort to ascertain the truth of charges of
competency directed against the person engaged
in the work and to refrain from the use of inflammatory and exaggerated statements."
In all of the above cases it appears that even if there
were privilege, the publication itself, by going too far
or by being combined with evidence failing to show a
reasonable investigation as to the truth of the facts,
destroys the privilege in the inferences of malice that
arises without a showing of spite, ill will, or hatred,
apart from the letter or statements contained therein.
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The jury in the instant case, due to the Court's
repeated references to actual malice and the Court's
erroneous definition of actual malice (Instruction No.9),
even though they found the statements or part of them
to be wholly untrue or to be defamrutory, would be
unable to make a finding for the plaintiff under the
Court's exclusive definition of actual malice, and Instruction No. 9 together with the repeated reference to actual
malice throughout the instructions, in fact, constituted
a directed verdict of no cause of action.
In addition to the above discussion and cases, the
Court's repetition of the words, "actual malice," and
the necessity of the showing that overcomes that actual
malice, were unduly emphasized by its multiple use in the
instructions set forth above, and, therefore, highly prejudicial to the plaintiff.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.
10 ON PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASON TO BELIEVE,
AND FAILURE TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7-A, ON THE BASIS OF REASONABLE
DILIGEN·CE AND THE REASONABLE PRUDENT MAN
TEST. (Assignment No.3)

Defendant excepted to the Court's Instruction Xo.
10 with regard to conditional privilege, and in conjunction therewith, excepted to the Court's refusal to give
plaintiff's Instruction No. 11 regarding the showing of
actual rnalice fron1 a 'Yillful or intentional act causing
injury without just cause, although not sho,ving hatred
or spite as set forth in the Courfs Instruction X o. 9.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
As discussed in Points I and II above, there can
be no doubt of the context and tone of the letter (Exhibit
2) written by Dr. Moench to Dr. Hellewell that (a) his
intent was to advise the unknown girl, daughter of
Hellewell's p.atient Williams, not to marry the plaintiff
Berry; (b) the intent of the letter by its own terms and
statements of fact, or we should say "purported facts,"
rather than merely diagnosis and impressions as requested by Dr. Hellewell, was with the intent on the
part of the defendant to paint the character of the
plaintiff .as black as possible to influence the unknown
girl. The Court states in Instruction No. 10,
". . . must consider, among other things,
whether Dr. 11oench had probable cause to believe
that the statements he made in the letter were
true.
"This is becauS'e under the law the presence
of probable cause is evidence of good faith and of
the absence of malice.''
In conjunction with Instruction 10, the Court instructs
in Instruction No. 11 regarding probable cause:
"You are instructed that if, after a consideration of the evidence in this case, you find that
Dr. Moench acted as a reasonable prudent Doctor
of Psychiatry in obtaining a medical history of
plaintiff from sources reasonably available, even
though some of the information obtained was
hearsay or the actual truth thereof not kno-vvn,
and that the letter was written under the reasonable belief and in good faith that the statements
were correct, then you are instructed that it makes
no difference whether or not the statements can
now be shown to be incorrect.
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"Therefore, if you find from the evidence in
this case that Dr. Moench did reasonably believe
the statements to be correct, your verdict must
be in favor of Dr. Moench and against plaintiff,
no cause of action, whether such statements were
correct or incorrect, unless plaintiff proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that such statements were made because of 'actual malice' against
plaintiff.''
In giving Instruction No. 11 (statement of the case
supra), the Court required only that the jury determine
with regard to reasonable belief the test of a reasonable
prudent doctor of psychiatry's basis of belief. The Court
gave no instruction regarding the test for determining
that belief, nor did it give the test of the reasonable
prudent man as is normally set forth by the Court,
allowing the jury to use themselves .and their acquaintances as a measure or guide.
The affirmative language of Instruction :?:-~ o. 11
leaves the doctor's own staten1ents as to Iris good faith
the only test for the jury's belief or disbelief as to good
faith, regardless of the fact that those state1nents are
self-serving. The Court refused plaintiff's requested instructions regarding reasonable belief and plaintiff's
requested Instruction No. 7-A "~ith regard to the basis
of determining reasonable belief or reasonable c.au8e.
The only evidence in the record regarding re.asonable
basis for belief \Yas the state1nent of Dr.

~Ioench

and

that of Dr. Nelson regarding obtaining of infor1nation
in psyehiatrie

ea~P~ -

and the Court \Yill note that Dr.

Nelson took gren t rnre to secure thP consent of the plain-
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tiff in writing before releasing information of any type
concerning the plaintiff (R. 117-122).
CONCLUSION
The law in this country since the time of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights has been based upon the
maxim that "where there is a wrong the law or equity
will furnish a remedy." In this case, there is no question
that the defendant released information which he had
made no attempt to verify, though for at least a portion
of the information, proof of its verification was at his
finger tips, to-wit: The records of the Salt Lake Clinic
where he worked, which would have given him the status
of the plaintiff's account. The doctor blithely released
defamatory information per se with, we repeat, no effort
to verify the truth or falsity of the information concerning plaintiff, his habits, his family life, his relatives,
his credit, his grades in school, and all based on hearsay
information received a period of seven years prior to the
publication of the defamatory matter.
In making the above statement, we ignore the defendant's duty .arising from the confidential relationship
between doctor and patient which would prevent the
extraction of confidences even under oath in a court
of law. Yet, the defendant did release the information,
not in accordance with a request made to him for information, but by going far over and beyond the information
requested in setting forth unverified statements as fact.
The entire letter (Exhibit 2) was a willing, intenti!onal
setting forth of libelous statements, and further shows
that they were set forth with the intent to do harm to
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the plaintiff by attempting to forestall or prevent his,
the plaintiff's, marriage to a person unknown to the
p·ublisher and in whom he had no interest.
We contend that under the statutes of this state
regarding libel and conditional privilege, and in cases
where this Court has ruled on such privilege, the entire
record in the instant case fails to show an interest in
the defendant requiring protection which might give rise
to a conditional privilege. The record also fails to show
any moral, social, or medical duty giving rise to a conditional p-rivilege.
Dr. ~ioench took statements from a seven-year-old
record, which to his knowledge was compiled from the
statements of at least three persons, the plaintiff, Ethella
Berry, and Ethella Berry's sister. The doctor .also kne'v
at the time of writing that the statements made by Mrs.
Berry and her sister were made during a period replete
"\vith marital difficulties between the plaintiff and his
former wife. Yet, the doctor published~ in a letter to
another doctor, the context of those state1nents as f.act,
with the only inference arising fron1 the tone of the
letter being that he knew the information would be released as fact to the patient of Dr. Helle,Yell and transmitted by the patient to the patient's daughter.
The doctor also realized th.at he had no right or
authority to release the inforn1ation, as is evidenced by
the first sentence of his letter. Yet he claimed, and the
Court instructed, that he had a privilege to release the
infor1nation because he felt that there \Yas a 1nor.al, social
and 1nedical duty. l-Ias the pO\\'"er of the n1edical profes-
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sion in this country reached a point where doctors may
release to the world not only secrets given to them in
confidance for furtherance of treatment, but hears.ay
information derived from other persons and defamatory
in itself, and then claim a privilege giving them an impunity from consequences arising from the defam.atory
nature of the statements .and untruths contained in unverified statements on their own contention that they
feel it their medical duty, not to the public, not to a
group, but to some person or persons unknown to them.
Dr. Moench's own admission was that he knew nothing
of Dr. Hellewell's patient outside of Dr. Hellewell's
brief letter (Exhibit 1). Yet, he answered, not giving
the requested medical diagnosis nor impressions, but
giving as fact untrue and defamatory statements together
with unsolicited advice to the unknown person three relationships removed from the defendant.
We think this is neither the word nor the spirit of
the law nor the intent of the legislature in drafting and
passing statutes in this state regarding conditional privileges, nor of the cases ruled on by the court. There is
no question th.at the statutes from the libel cases, including the Coombs case, the Hale case, and Williams v.
Standard quoted supra. All require an interest in the
publisher, the interest being a protection of pecuniary
rights in the first two cases and the express statutory
interest given to newspap·ers by our legislature with respect to the protection of .a public interest in the latter
case.
Further, we contend, in reading the Court's instruc-
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tions as a whole, that the unwarranted repetition of the
words "actual malice" and the requirement of finding
of "actual malice," together with the Court's Instruction
No. 9 defining actual malice as "hate, spite or ill \Vill,"
outside of the publication alleged to be lihelo-l_,s, constituted a directed verdict against the plaintiff and wrongfully deprived him of a remeay for a grievous and unwarranted injury arising from the arbitrary and intentional act of the defendant.
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized the
need for such remedy when it stated in Smitlz v. Driscoll,
(Sup. Ct. Wash., Jan. 30, 1917) 162 P. 572:

"A complaint stating facts entitling plaintiff
to recover for breach by a physician of the confidential relation with his patient is not invalid,
though it· improperly designates the action as
slander."
Pleading, Key No. 49.
Physicians & Surgeons, Key 12, 18 (±) and see

15(9)
" ( P. 572) Neither is it necessary to pursue
at length the inquiry of "\Yhether a cause of action
lies in favor of a patient against a physician for
wrongfully divulging confidential counnunirations.
For the purposes of "~hat "\Ye shall say it "\Yill be
assmned that, for so palpable a "\Yrong~ the la\Y
provides a ren1edy.
Respectfully subn1itted,

McCARTY & HATCH
by SlTl\fNER J. 1-I~\_TCH
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